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INTRODUCTION

Nicole Armbruster lives a nomadic lifestyle, off the grid, in her pull
behind camper with a simple message hanging from her rear-view
mirror, “come back with a warrant.”1 She preaches to her “comrades”
about revolution, and she is a staunch supporter of the Second
Amendment.2 Her arrest record spans five different states: Washington,
Arizona, Virginia, Minnesota, and Florida, as well as Washington D.C.3 Her
charges range from unlawful assembly and failure to disperse to violation
of the federal Anti-Riot Act and assault; of both opposing protestors and
a police officer.4
Robert Rundo posts on social media, “[w]hen the squads not out
smashing commies… #nationalist #lifestyle.”5 In the modern era of civil
unrest, he uses social media to spread his misplaced views by posting
photographs and videos of him and his fellow combatants engaging in
physical training and “mixed martial arts street-fighting techniques.”6 He
travels to right-wing political rallies, with the apparent goal of providing
“security” against counter-protesters.7
The brief stories of Armbruster and Rundo illustrate the vast divide
in American society.8 Armbruster is a self-proclaimed member of the antifascist movement (“Antifa”),9 whereas Rundo is an outspoken white
supremacist and leader in the Rise Above Movement (“RAM”). 10 Prior to
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the United States v. Rundo (“Rundo II”), the
Central District of California noted that, “[i]t is easy to champion free

1. See Aram Roston, American Antifa, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Aug. 25, 2021, 11:00
AM), www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-antifa-profile [perma.cc/
8CD6-C63F] (detailing the nomadic and isolated life of a member of the Anti-Fascist
organization Antifa and giving a background into what a member of the far-left group’s
life entails).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See United States v. Rundo (Rundo I), 497 F. Supp. 3d 872, 878 (C.D. Cal., June 11,
2019) (referring to Defendant Rundo’s social media posts to illustrate his use of both
Facebook and Twitter, which enables extreme groups such as the Rise Above
Movement to influence and recruit members).
6. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Western District of Virginia,
Federal Grand Jury Indicts Four from California for Conspiracy to Violate Riots Statute
(Oct. 10, 2018), www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/federal-grand-jury-indicts-fourcalifornia-conspiracy-violate-riots-statute
[perma.cc/URX4-GJNU]
(providing
background into the Rise Above Movement, that Defendant Rundo was affiliated with,
while also detailing the type of tactics or training used by members when preparing
for a political rally).
7. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (noting that defendants affiliated with RAM
would frequently travel to political rallies to provide, what the group called “security”
for right-wing protestors and would purposefully cause altercations with any
opposing citizens who also attended the rally).
8. Roston, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Rundo (Rundo II), 990 F.3d 709, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2021).
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speech when it advocates a viewpoint with which we agree.” 11
Armbruster and Rundo come from different ends of the political
spectrum, where their respective viewpoints stand in stark contrast of
one another. 12 Yet, the First Amendment of the Constitution treats both
Armbruster and Rundo equally.13 In recent years, United States
prosecutors have turned to a familiar piece of legislation, known as the
Anti-Riot Act of 1968 (“the Act”).14 However, the Act, controversial at its
conception, is now fifty-three years old.15 The Act was drafted and signed
into law thirty-six years before the founding of Facebook16 and thirtynine years prior to the inception of Twitter.17 As social media continues
to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas, the federal government
may begin to use the Anti-Riot Act to prosecute individuals who use social
media to merely advocate for social unrest.
In Rundo II, the Ninth Circuit grapples with how to save this piece of
legislation. The federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968 is inadequate to fight the
current battles with big technology firms, such as Facebook and Twitter,
and their algorithms that consistently push hate and violence. 18 The
viewpoints of individuals, like Armbruster and Rundo, are amplified by
social media. 19Undoubtedly, social media has also been used to drive

11. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (illustrating the district court’s view that an
individual’s freedom of speech cannot be abridged because it promotes a viewpoint
that is different).
12. See Roston, supra note 1 (stating that Amanda Armbruster is a self-proclaimed
member of left-wing group Antifa); Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 712 (detailing Robert Rundo
and members of RAM as a right-wing, nationalist organization).
13. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 876 (documenting that Defendants had attended three
political rallies in California with the purpose of aiding and providing security for rightwing extremists).
14. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2101-2102 (1968).
15. See Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The Need for
Criminal Law Theory, 20 VILL. L. REV. 897, 911 (1975) (establishing an in-depth
background to the inception of the Anti-Riot Act, specifically alluding to the political
climate of the United States after the Acts inception in the mid-1970’s).
16. See Mark Hall, Facebook, BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/topic/Facebook
[perma.cc/LX28-FV85] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021), (providing an informational
article that gives a brief introduction to the founding of Facebook, while also
demonstrating that the Anti-Riot Act was drafted decades before the social media site,
now considered one of the most influential inventions in human history).
17. See Twitter, BRITANNICA, (Aug. 12, 2021), www.britannica.com/topic/Twitter
[perma.cc/9S6A-NXJT] (providing a brief introduction to the founding of Twitter,
decades after the introduction of the federal Anti-Riot Act provides perspective to the
potentially waning relevancy of the statute).
18. See Sounman Hong, Political Polarization on Twitter: Implications for the Use of
Social Media in Digital Governments, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 777, 777-78 (2016) (discussing
the term “echo chambers” as “highly fragmented, customized, and niche-oriented”
characteristics of social media that enhances political polarization).
19. See Brett Milano, The Algorithm Has Primacy Over Media…Over Each of Us, and
it Controls What We Do, HARVARD L. TODAY (Nov. 18, 2021), today.law.harvard.edu/thealgorithm-has-primacy-over-media-over-each-of-us-and-it-controls-what-we-do
[perma.cc/2KDV-ZGY8] (summarizing a Harvard Law panel discussion on social
media’s “foster[ing] a more toxic political dialogue that has infected politics at large,
accelerating polarization and the decline of legacy media.”).
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violence and protests; but it is also a tool that can be used for greater
organization and freedom of information.20
Part II of this Case Note will establish the background of the federal
Anti-Riot Act and the prior case law relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in
Rundo II.21 This section will also serve as an overview of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, the seminal 1969 Supreme Court case on freedom of expression. 22
Brandenburg is important because it still serves as a guide to the freedom
of speech debate today.23
Part III of this Case Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Rundo II.24 Specifically, this section will establish the jurisprudence that
the Ninth Circuit utilized to find that the Act was not unconstitutional on
its face.25 In the analysis of the case, this section will illustrate the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion on the Act as a useful piece of legislation to protect
American citizens from future rioting.26
Part IV of this Case Note, while building upon the analysis of the
Ninth Circuit, will discuss my personal analysis of the policies
surrounding the Anti-Riot Act. This discussion will focus on the Act’s
applicability to individuals accused of using the facilities of interstate
commerce, but not to incite a riot. Particularly, the Act should not be used
by the government to prosecute citizens based on mere social media
posts that do not meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement.27 This
section will also discuss potential solutions such as relying on states to be
more influential in how to protect non-violent protests and prevent riots.
Part V of this Case Note will briefly summarize the analysis utilized
by the Ninth Circuit’s Rundo II opinion, as well as creating a call to action

20. See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2012) (commenting on Americans’ use of social media to organize
themselves unlike any other time in history and how the government may narrowly
regulate speech brought through technology).
21. Id.
22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (establishing the Supreme
Court’s differentiation between speech that is “the mere abstract teaching” of the need
for violence and using speech to “prepar[e] a group for violent action,” which is relied
upon by the District Court in Rundo I and the Ninth Circuit in Rundo II); Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961) (ruling that a member of a communist activist
party’s speech was protected because the individual was merely teaching the tenants
of Communism and was not preparing its followers to incite imminent unlawful
action).
23. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
24. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 709.
25. See id. at 721 (holding that the Act can be made constitutional by severing the
overly broad language that does not comport with the First Amendment).
26. See id. (stating that “[o]nce the offending language is elided from the Act by
means of severance the Act is not unconstitutional on its face,” and “it would be
cavalier to assert that the government and its citizens cannot act but must sit quietly
and wait until they are actually physically injured.”).
27. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 450 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing that
“[t]he questions in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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to continue to bolster the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of
expression.

II.

BACKGROUND

The Framers of the United States, through a new form of
government, were steadfast in ensuring that no law would inhibit the
freedom of expression, or the right to peacefully assemble.28 In the 1960’s,
over a century and a half later, Americans exercised their First
Amendment rights as the United States underwent monumental changes
in civil rights, but unfortunately at a price.29 In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. stood in front of the Lincoln Memorial to give his “I Have a Dream”
speech.30 Only three months later, President John F. Kennedy was
assassinated in Dallas, Texas.31 A year after that, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.32 Four years later, in
1968, as the war in Vietnam raged on, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the voice
of the Civil Rights Movement, was assassinated by James Earl Ray.33 Near
the end of the decade, intended as an expansion of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 into law. 34
The Civil Rights Act is often revered for its focus on fair housing, however,
perhaps less often, it is cited for the introduction of the Anti-Riot Act.35
28. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L. J. 246,
252-53 (2018) (providing that the Framers were concerned with protecting “natural
rights,” or acts that occur “naturally” and did not “depend on the existence of a
government” and therefore should be free of strict government control); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”).
29.
See
The
Sixties:
Moments
in
Time,
PBS
(2005),
www.pbs.org/opb/thesixties/timeline/timeline_text.html [perma.cc/AFR4-QMMT]
(providing an in-depth, comprehensive timeline of the major events of the 1960’s)
[hereinafter The Sixties: Moments in Time].
30. See Martin Luther King, Jr., NAT’L ARCHIVES (July 20, 2020),
www.archives.gov/nyc/exhibit/mlk [perma.cc/X4BL-SGZL] (detailing the events
surrounding Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination, resulting in the tragic death of a
national icon of the 1960’s Civil Right Movement, but also the event that spurred many
lawmakers into action to create the Anti-Riot Act statute).
31. The Sixties: Moments in Time, supra note 29.
32. See Civil Rights Acts (1964, 1968), GEORGETOWN L. LIBR. (Aug. 26, 2021),
guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4172702
[perma.cc/E849-3JRE]
(providing a guide that offers a quick synopsis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as
1968, along with a brief overview of the topics and particular civil rights protected
under both bills).
33. Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., STANFORD U. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
RSCH. & EDUC. INST. (last visited Oct. 6, 2021), kinginstitute.stanford.edu/
encyclopedia/assassination-martin-luther-king-jr [perma.cc/CV7N-R7HQ].
34. See Civil Rights Acts (1964, 1968), supra note 32 (establishing the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 as an extension of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 is most often credited with the Fair Housing Act).
35. See id. (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as legislation meant to ease the
unequal housing in the United States in the 1960’s, mostly driven by racial
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The 1960’s has been defined by tragedy, anger, and yet progress. 36 With
this backdrop in mind, as one of the most turbulent decades in American
history ended, the Anti-Riot Act was established. 37

A. The Background to the Anti-Riot Act
Setting the stage and providing a look into the major events of the
time captures where the United States was culturally and politically in the
1960s.38 Congress could not agree on the best approach to solve the
numerous incidents of violent riots that gripped the Nation. 39 The AntiRiot Act of 1968 was the federal government’s solution. 40 Where states
criminalized the conduct of inciting a riot, the Act was created to
criminalize any person who incited a riot through the use of interstate
commerce.41 The Act has also been criticized for having racial
underpinnings, specifically geared towards criminalizing many African
Americans during the protests of the late 1960’s.42
Today, the Act has reemerged into the legal lexicon as prosecutors
have begun to use the law against “white supremacists, demonstrators
advocating for racial justice, and insurrectionists at the U.S. Capitol.”43
The revival of the Act, however, does not come without controversy. 44 As
a potential split in the United States Circuit Courts emerges over whether
or not the Act is facially overbroad, and as such unconstitutional, the
language of the Act remains under siege.45 The Ninth Circuit opinion in

discrimination in African Americans’ ability to procure quality housing).
36. See Leland Ware, Civil Rights and the 1960s: A Decade of Unparalleled Progress,
72 MD. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2013) (comparing the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s
to previous decades and providing a summary of events that “propelled African
Americans from segregation to full citizenship.”).
37. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2101-2102 (1968).
38. The Sixties: Moments in Time, supra note 29.
39. See Zalman, supra note 15, at 912 (detailing the increase in violence and rioting,
the United States Congress was tasked with creating a federal law that would allow the
government to punish citizens that traveled and used interstate commerce as a means
to facilitate a riot).
40. See id. at 911 (establishing that Congress created the Act and was credited as a
“more conservative approach of criminalizing riotous conduct was adopted to solve
the problem.”).
41. See Kaminski, supra note 20, at 3 (analyzing the definitions of riots and
incitement to riot under the common law and federal statutes, while creating a
“taxonomy” of constitutional problems that arise).
42. See Recent Case: First Amendment – Federal Anti-Riot Act – Fourth Circuit Finds
the Anti-Riot Act Partially Unconstitutional. – United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518 (4th
Cir. 2020), 134 HARV. L. REV. 2614, 2614 (2021) (pointing to the racial and historical
criticisms of the Act and where the Fourth Circuit opinion missed the opportunity to
discuss the Acts initial purpose was to quell citizens’ ability to travel to other areas of
the United States in order to march or join a protest) [hereinafter Recent Case].
43. See id. (analyzing the Fourth Circuit opinion that found the Act partially
unconstitutional as a crucial precedent and demonstrating that a potential circuit split
may result).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Rundo II broke down its analysis and scrutiny of the Act into three main
areas: (1) the “overt act provisions,” (2) the definition of a “[r]iot,” and (3)
the definition of “incit[ing] a riot.”46
1.

The Overt Act Provisions of the Anti-Riot Act

Fundamentally, the Act describes four “overt acts” that if a citizen
were to commit through the use of interstate commerce would result in a
fine or imprisonment “not more than five years.”47 The interstate
commerce requirement is violated under the Act when an individual
either travels interstate or uses a “facility of interstate commerce.” 48
Therefore, through either the act of traveling across state lines or in the
use of a “facility of interstate commerce,” a person violates the Act when
acting with:
[I]ntent – (1) to incite a riot; or (2) to organize, promote, encourage,
participate in, or carry on a riot; or (3) to commit any act of violence in
furtherance of a riot; or (4) to aid or abet any person in inciting or
participating in or carrying on a riot or committing any act of violence in
furtherance of a riot . . .49

Courts, like the Seventh Circuit, have held that the “overt acts” are to
be considered “goals” or are themselves the required acts, meaning an
individual with the goal to incite a riot or to aid someone in creating a riot,
through the use of interstate commerce, can be punished under the Act. 50
2.

The Anti-Riot Act’s Definition of a “Riot” and “Inciting a Riot”

Concerned with the Act being “overbroad” and encroaching on
protected speech, both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits determined that the
Act’s unconstitutional provisions could be severed.51 The Act’s definition
46. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 714-15.
47. Id. at 714.
48. See id. (providing that the Anti-Riot Act does not specifically list the internet or
social media as a “facility of interstate commerce,” but it was implied by the district
court in Rundo I that the Act does not consider its list of “facilities” to be exhaustive);
18 U.S.C.S. § 2101(a) (1968) (establishing a non-exhaustive list of the facilities of
interstate commerce as “[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses
any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including but not limited to, the mail,
telegraph, telephone, radio, or television…”).
49. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2101(a)(1)-(4) (1968).
50. See Zalman, supra note 15, at 920 (illustrating concern that the Act is vague on
the intent an alleged perpetrator must have when it is considered to have committed
an overt act under the statute); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 n.17 (2000)
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137, 1400 (4th ed. 1968)) (defining “mens rea” as
“criminal intent” or the purposefully state of mind necessary to commit a crime);
United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding from the
Seventh Circuit where the defendants were referred to as the “Chicago Seven,” were
charged under the Anti-Riot Act for the direct promotion of violence over multiple
days, at multiple protests, during the Democratic Party Convention that was held in
Chicago, Illinois).
51. See generally United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518, 526 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding
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of a riot is considered “a public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of
violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more
persons, which act, or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger.” 52
The term “clear and present danger” has also been interpreted to mean
that violent speech is used or will promote an “imminent” or strong
possibility of leading to violence.53 Under the Act, a riot is essentially
considered a “public disturbance” where the acts or credible threats by
one or more persons have a strong chance of causing actual injuries to
other citizens or their property.54
The Act also defines the phrase “to incite a riot.”55 Initially concerned
with assisting state and local governments in curbing the increase of
“riotous conduct,” Congress needed to clearly define how exactly a person
incites a riot. 56 Under the Act, the phrase “to incite a riot” defines a person
who wishes “to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on
a riot, includes, but is not limited to, urging or instigating other persons
to riot.”57 The Act, however, limits the definition to allow for “the mere
oral or written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief,” so long
as it does not advocate for violence or the “rightfulness” of committing
violent acts.58 The Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the Act’s language and overt
act provisions, found multiple instances in which the Act infringed on an
individual’s freedom of expression under the First Amendment.59

that where defendants were a part of a violent right-wing protest in Charleston, South
Carolina, the Act was not overbroad and severing the statute to make it comport with
the First Amendment).
52. Assemblage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
assemblage [perma.cc/T54Q-6WQ4] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021) (defining assemblage
as “a collection of persons or things”, or “the act of assembling”); See also 18 U.S.C.S §
2102(a) (stating “an assemblage of three or more persons. . .”).
53. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444 (1969) (per curiam) (providing the seminal
Supreme Court opinion that established an imminency test that has been used by
courts to differentiate between whether speech has been used to “merely teach” or
essentially advocate for violence, or whether the speech used is meant to “prepare a
group” to take violent actions that are highly likely to occur).
54. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(a)(1) (1968) (defining the term “riot” as “a public
disturbance involving acts or threats of violence by one or more persons part of an
assemblage of three or more people, which acts or acts constitute a clear and present
dangers of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person. . .”).
55. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968) (defining “to incite a riot” but also placing a
limitation clause to the end of the definition that states any advocacy of ideas or
expression of beliefs are protected, except those that involve the advocacy of violence,
assertions of the rightness of, or the right to commit violence that the Ninth Circuit
found violates the Brandenburg imminence requirement).
56. See Zalman, supra note 15, at 911 (demonstrating that at the time the Act was
signed into law, Congress had made slowing the trend of violent protests a top priority
and drafted the Act to ensure, that on top of any state or local riot laws, the federal
government would be able to criminalize any person who traveled through interstate
commerce to incite or take part in a riot).
57. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102 (1968).
58. Id.
59. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
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B. The History and Establishment of the Brandenburg
Imminence Requirement
In Rundo II,60 the Ninth Circuit comports its constitutional review of
the Act to Brandenburg.61 The Brandenburg imminence requirement was
shaped and developed from over a century of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.62 The Court, starting with Schenck v. United States,63 began
its search for the proper test to demonstrate when mere speech
transcends into the imminent danger of unlawful action. 64 Far before the
Brandenburg Court defined the current imminence requirement, the
“clear and present danger” test was born.65
1.

Prior to Brandenburg: The Clear and Present Danger Test

Though the First Amendment protects a vast amount of expression,
it is not absolute.66 As early as 1919, the Supreme Court began
deliberating on how to balance an individual’s freedom of expression
with how to criminalize types of speech that tended to create detrimental
results to society.67 Speech that is detrimental to society “can pose such
an immediate danger of harm that we can no longer afford as a society to
tolerate it.” 68 To promote order and peace, certain types of speech have
always been considered “unprotected.”69 One of the prominent categories
60. Id.
61. See id. at 709 (expressing its attempt to comport the Anti-Riot Act to the
Supreme Court’s Brandenburg imminence requirement, the Ninth Circuit severs the
overly broad language from the Act).
62. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (establishing the Supreme
Court’s “clear and present danger test” in its attempt to determine which expression
can still be criminalized, while not infringing upon First Amendment rights).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see generally Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919)
(upholding a conviction of a publisher that distributed twelve articles that were critical
of the United States involvement in World War I); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
217 (1919) (upholding a conviction of a speaker who directly attacked United States
involvement in World War I); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S 616, 624 (1919)
(affirming the conviction of defendants who published critical articles about the United
States in a predominantly German newspaper that was circulated in the United States
during World War I).
65. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
66. See Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206 (1919) (providing that “the First Amendment
while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have been, and
obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language”);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (stating that “speech is not
absolute.”).
67. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507 (demonstrating the need for the legislature to
prevent the types of speech that are “so undesirable as to warrant criminal sanction.”).
68. See generally Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy Online: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech
in the Internet Era, 31 TOL. L. REV. 227, 230 (2000) (discussing the use of the
Brandenburg imminence test, and its application to online expression of extremist
websites).
69. See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass'n., 564 U.S. 786, 790-91 (2011) (providing a list
of unprotected forms of speech, outside the protection of the First Amendment are
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of unprotected speech is speech intended to incite illegal activity. 70
In Schenck v. United States, the Supreme Court found that an
individual that spoke out against the United States involvement in World
War I rose to the level of a “clear and present danger.”71 The Court stated
that any words used in circumstances that are of “such a nature to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
Congress has a right to prevent” are punishable and outside the
protection of the First Amendment.72 However, the Supreme Court
struggled to clearly define what was considered a “clear and present
danger.”73 Throughout most of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court
was unable to create a consistent test that would delineate between
expression that was merely advocating a viewpoint with expression that
was directed at causing violent and unlawful action.74
Finally, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, though
credited with establishing the clear and present danger test, realized that
the test did not require the expression to be directed at carrying out
illegal activity. 75 Under the clear and present danger test, a defendant that
was advocating for political reform, or even violence, but lacked the intent
“obscenity, incitement, and fighting words.”).
70. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (establishing that Congress, through its legislation,
has a right to criminalize speech that will bring about “substantive evils” or illegal
activities).
71. See id. at 49 (affirming the punishment of Defendant Schenck who had sent
15,000 leaflets that were critical to America’s war effort and the conscription of
citizens into the Armed Forces).
72. Id.; see also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)
(explaining that the First Amendment does not protect speech that poses a clear and
present danger similar to an individual “shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.”).
73. See Richard Parker, Clear and Present Danger Test, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCL. (2009),
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test
[perma.cc/7CJ9-EHWD] (providing a brief overview to the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence that became known as the “imminence requirement”
established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 397 U.S. 444 (1969)); see Gerald Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History,
27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 749 (1975) (discussing the shortcomings of the “clear and present
danger” approach because the line between protected and unprotected expression
was open to the subjective discretion of the judges).
74. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (affirming conviction of
defendant who had distributed pamphlets that merely “advocated” for social change
and overthrowing the government); John R. Vile, Incitement to Imminent Lawless
Action,
FIRST
AMEND.
ENCYCL.
(2009),
www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action [perma.cc/5ATERKJB] (describing the majority in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) which
created the precedent that states have the right to punish “utterances” that, though
being small and passive, may be the “revolutionary spark” that leads to violence);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (upholding precedent set in Gitlow, by
affirming conviction of member of the Communist Labor Party of California who
traveled the state advocating for revolutionary social change).
75. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the conviction
of a defendant who was distributing pamphlets, Justice Holmes tried in many opinions
to narrow the scope of the clear and present danger test to facilitate a more “prospeech” approach).
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to incite or act upon its message could still be punished.76 Justice Holmes
realized that the clear and present danger test infringed on individuals’
First Amendment rights because it did not require any demonstration of
incitement.77 Holmes stated:
every idea is an incitement . . . [t]he only difference between the expression
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s
enthusiasm for the result . . . [b]ut whatever may be thought of the
redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present
conflagration. 78

Subsequently, the Supreme Court slowly began to add the
requirement that for an expression to fall outside the protection of the
First Amendment, there must also be a likelihood the expression will
incite illegal activity.79 Finally, in 1969, the Supreme Court articulated its
most recent test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,80 laying the foundation for the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the Act in Rundo II.81
2.

Today’s Standard: The Brandenburg Imminence Requirement

The Ninth Circuit applied the current test, the Brandenburg
imminence requirement, to determine whether the language in the Act
complied with the First Amendment; which only permits the punishment
of unprotected speech.82 Brandenburg v. Ohio83 is a seminal United States
Supreme Court case.84 Brandenburg reached national prominence when
a leader of the white supremacist group, the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), was
convicted under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism statute.85 During a KKK
rally, the appellant made disparaging statements about African
Americans and Jewish citizens, while promoting upcoming political
marches in Washington D.C., Florida, and Mississippi.86 The Ohio Criminal
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (reasoning that merely because someone has an idea does not
necessarily mean that idea will lead to an incitement of violence, rather, it could
instead be an incitement to reason).
79. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (adopting the “gravity of evil” refinement of the clear
and present danger test as, “[i]n each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger."); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321 (1957)
(demonstrating the need for an imminence requirement where “language of
incitement is not constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and
cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such
as reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur.”).
80. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
81. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 713.
82. Id.
83. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444 (providing a distinction between a statute
that is only able to punish conduct, and subsequent speech, that has a more than likely
chance to incite a riot; a standard that is still used today).
84. Id.
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (2015).
86. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 (detailing an appellant that was recognized
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Syndicalism statute, punished individuals for “advocat[ing] . . . the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods
of terrorism as a means of accomplishing . . . political reform.” 87
The Brandenburg Court made the distinction between “the mere
abstract teaching,” or advocating, for violence versus “preparing a group
for violent action.”88 The Court decided that appellant’s First Amendment
rights were violated by the Ohio law and reversed the state’s ruling.89 In
doing so, it noted that if a law is unable to distinguish between a person’s
speech that is merely “teaching” with speech used to “prepare” a group of
people to commit violence, the law is unconstitutional; insisting that such
a law would violate the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.90
The distinction between speech that merely advocates violence with
speech intended to produce violence ultimately evolved into the
Brandenburg imminence requirement.91 Under this test, speech that is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action,” is not protected under the First
Amendment.92 The Brandenburg test, in other words, requires that an
individual’s expression, either oral or written, be of the nature that is
intended to instigate or provoke others into unlawful conduct. 93 The
second part of the test, however, requires that after the expression has
been established, there must be a likelihood that unlawful conduct will
take place.94 The Supreme Court determined that because the KKK
leader’s speech merely advocated for violence, the speech carried a

on a video recording while giving a speech to other members of the Ku Klux Klan
claiming to organize thousands of Klan members to march in protest, the Court
ultimately stated the speech on the video was protected and did not meet the
imminence requirement).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 448 (overruling a previous decision in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927), the Supreme Court established that a state statute that punishes mere
advocacy of violence is unconstitutional).
89. Id. at 449.
90. See id. at 448 (establishing the Supreme Court’s own test based on an
individual’s speech that revolves around “teaching” of a particular view, in contrast to
“preparing a group for violent actions” must be differentiated in state or local statutes
dealing with rioting).
91. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973) (establishing the Brandenburg
imminence requirement protected the speaker who stated to the police, “we’ll take the
f**king street again” because the speaker did not specify when they meant to return,
the Court reasoned the speaker could have meant an indefinite amount of time and
could not be punished); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34
(establishing the Brandenburg imminence requirement protected a speaker that made
the indirect threat of violence to any African American protestors that failed to boycott
a hardware store).
92. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
93. Id.; see 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968) (using the terms instigating or provoking
to define the conduct necessary to find an individual’s expression is punishable for
inciting a riot).
94. Id.
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minimal likelihood of leading to an imminent threat of unlawful action.95
In his concurrence, Justice Hugo Black thought that even though the
majority did not touch upon the “clear and present danger” requirement,
it should no longer be used because of the difficulty in distinguishing
between “teaching” and “preparing a group” even when the speaker is
advocating for violence.96 Brandenburg remained the standard at the time
the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on the Act in Rundo II.97

C. The Background Facts of Rundo II
Robert Rundo, Robert Boman, Tyler Laube, and Aaron Eason
(collectively “Defendants”) were leading members of RAM, which was
formed to promote a white supremacist ideology.98 Defendants and other
RAM members traveled to political rallies and “boasted” about their
actions at the rallies in text messages and on social media.99 Social media
platforms Facebook and Twitter were common means of communication
amongst RAM members.100 Members used Facebook to share
photographs of their activity at political rallies.101 Initially, the Central
District of California did not find that Defendants violated the Anti-Riot
Act. 102 The district court did, however, charge Defendants with
“conspiring and agreeing to riot” as well as “aiding and abetting one
another in using facilities of interstate commerce.”103 The government
argued that Defendants used the internet, a telephone, and a credit card
to perpetrate their conspiracy to cause violence.104 However, the district
court noted, this conduct fell within their constitutional right to the
95. Id.
96. See id. at 450 (Black, J., concurring) (preferring that “clear and present danger”
doctrine be struck by the Court).
97. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 709.
98. See id. (detailing that the defendants were present at political rallies in
Huntington Beach and Berkely California to promote and protect nationalists and
white supremacy ideology).
99. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876 (introducing evidence that Defendant Eason
had “used a credit card to rent a passenger van to travel from Southern California to
[a] rally in Berkely.”).
100. See id. at 878 (detailing that Defendant Rundo had used Twitter to promote
and recruit new members to RAM, he had posted a message on his account which
stated, “[w]hen the squads not out smashing commies . . . #nationalist #lifestyle” after
he had attended a political rally a month previous to his post).
101. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Western District of Virginia, Federal
Grand Jury Indicts Four from California for Conspiracy to Violate Riots Statute (Oct. 10,
2018).
102. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (providing that Defendant Laube pled
guilty to the only charge against him, while the remaining defendants moved to have
the charges under the Anti-Riot Act dismissed; however, once the district court
granted their motion and dismissed their indictments, Laube moved to withdraw his
guilty plea which was also granted by the district court).
103. Id.
104. See id. (stating that the district court did not approve of the government’s
argument that a credit card used to rent a van was strong enough to demonstrate that
the defendants had engaged in interstate commerce).
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freedom of expression.105
The district court determined the Act broadly defined the term “riot”
as some event in the future.106 The court was concerned that the RAM
members’ social media posts that advocated for attendance at political
rallies, in some instances up to six months in advance, lacked the
imminence requirement under Brandenburg.107 Many of Defendants’
messages were posted after they attended a political rally and
consequently, would not fall under the Act’s definition of a “riot” or
“inciting a riot.”108 The court was further concerned when the
government charged Defendants for using a credit card to rent a van
weeks before a political rally, as the court found this conduct too far
removed to comport with the Act’s “imminent threat of violence or
lawless conduct.”109 The district court ultimately dismissed the charges
against Defendants because the Act infringed on “pre-riot”
communications that were protected under the First Amendment. 110 The
government appealed.111

D. Procedural Overview of the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion in
Rundo II
After reviewing the case de novo, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
reversed and remanded the district court’s decision, finding that the Act
was able to be severed of its unconstitutional language.112 On appeal,
Defendants maintained their argument that the Act was facially
overbroad.113 Defendants noted four points of emphasis to promote their
argument: (1) the overt act provisions, as a whole, violated the
Brandenburg imminence requirement; (2) the provisions in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (4) of 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a) were overly broad;
(3) the Act’s definition of “riot” was unconstitutional; and (4) the
Defendant’s conduct was further protected by the heckler veto’s
doctrine.114
105. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (stating that the district court judge was
concerned that the Act was being used by the government to punish protected speech
on social media accounts that were either months or a year after Rundo had attended
the particular event resulting in the speech not meeting Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 880 (stating the speech exhibited by the RAM members was
protected because the posts on social media and text messages, sent between
members, did not cause imminent disorder).
108. Id. at 878
109. See id. (establishing that the district court also did not agree with the
government’s evidence that Defendant Eason’s use of a credit card and the renting of
a van was enough of decisive action to constitute him using the “facilities of interstate
commerce” in order to incite a riot).
110. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 709.
111. Id. at 721.
112. Id. at 709.
113. Id. at 715.
114. Id.
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Demonstrating a split among the Circuit Courts, the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits took different approaches in applying the Act’s overt act
provisions.115 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit decided to adopt the Seventh
Circuit’s approach.116 The Seventh Circuit determined that an individual’s
conduct does not violate the Act when its actions are merely steps to
incite, to promote, or aid in the furtherance of a riot. 117 Instead, the
actions of the individual must be closely connected to its speech.118 Next,
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion discussed 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1)-(2) and (4). 119
Defendants argued that the language of the subparagraphs (1), (2), and
(4) were also overly broad and unconstitutional.120 In the subparagraphs,
the Ninth Circuit focused on the words “urging,” “organizing,” and
“encourage[ing] and promot[ing],” to find that it preferred, unlike the
district court in Rundo I, to sever the unconstitutional language from the
Act.121 In this instance, the Ninth Circuit determined that the words
“urging” and “organizing” did not meet the Brandenburg imminence
requirement because the definitions of those words fell short of
contemplating an immediate action.122 The Ninth Circuit adopted the
Fourth Circuit’s approach where terms such as “urging” and “organizing”
did not lead to speech that was likely to cause imminent lawless action. 123
The Fourth Circuit found that the Act’s use of “urging,” “organizing,”
“encourage[ing] and promot[ing]” were too broad and infringed upon
protected speech.124
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Defendants’ assertion that the Act’s
definition of the term “riot” was unconstitutional.125 Instead, the court
decided Congress had expressed its version of the term “riot” to be
synonymous with “true threats.” 126 It concluded that the term’s definition
did not encroach on any protected speech under the First Amendment. 127
115. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716 n.8 (choosing to adopt the analysis of the Seventh
Circuit regarding the Act’s overt act provisions, while disagreeing with the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis that the overt act provisions equate to an “attempt statute. . .”).
116. See id. at 715-16 (providing that though the Ninth Circuit had adopted the
same approach as the Seventh Circuit, the court also stated that it disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Miselis, that the Act is an “attempt statute” where the
defendants had to merely attempt to commit any of the over acts in § 2101(a) which
does not comply with the Brandenburg imminence requirement; showing a potential
split among the circuit courts).
117. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361-62.
118. Id.
119. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
120. Id.
121. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 542-43 (demonstrating that the Ninth Circuit agrees
with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the Act was “severable” and severing the
statute would be preferred by Congress over complete invalidation).
122. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 720.
123. Miselis, 972 F.3d at 538.
124. Id.
125. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721 (holding that the Ninth Circuit reversed the
ruling of the district court based on the principle of severing the Act rather than
invalidating it completely).
126. Id. at 720.
127. Id.
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Finally, the court did not find that the Act violated the “heckler’s veto
doctrine.”128 The heckler’s veto doctrine is an unconstitutional, contentbased speech restriction that silences the speaker to prevent an
anticipated, violent reaction from the audience.129 The Ninth Circuit
determined that the heckler’s veto doctrine was not applicable because
the Act was violated by an individual’s conduct and was not based on the
hostile behavior of a listening audience.130

III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
This section provides an in-depth analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in Rundo II.131 In its unanimous decision, the court found that the
Act was not unconstitutional on its face and decided to apply the
severability doctrine.132 The Ninth Circuit determined that the majority of
the Act’s language complied with the First Amendment’s right to freedom
of expression.133 The court demonstrated its deference to Congress in
finding that a majority of the Act’s language was not overly broad and
merely severed the unconstitutional language.134 Second, applying the
Brandenburg imminence requirement, the court identified and removed
the specific language that did not meet the constitutional threshold. 135
Finally, once the unconstitutional language was removed, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case.136

128. See Rosenbaum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir.
2007) (similar to fighting words and unprotected speech, the heckler’s veto doctrine
is determinative based on the reaction of an audience, where, in contrast, the Act is
determinative of an individual’s conduct while using interstate commerce).
129. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 709.
132. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (explaining that the
severability doctrine applies when a court is unable to narrow its interpretation of a
statute to meet constitutional requirements, and it may sever only the unconstitutional
portion that is considered invalid); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 376 (1971) (addressing the unconstitutionality of a Congressional statute, a court
may construe the meaning of the statute to meet constitutional requirements to avoid
it from being invalidated).
133. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 714.
134. Id. at 718; see also Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1992) (quoting a previous case, the Ninth Circuit, in Rundo II, stated, “[w]e must
examine the meaning of the words to see whether one construction makes more sense
than the other as a means of attributing a rational purpose to Congress,” an example of
the Ninth Circuit’s rational basis of review).
135. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S at 448 (explaining that a statute that does not make
a clear distinction between expression that is merely advocating for violence with
expression that is directed at creating an actual and imminent threat of violence is
overly broad and infringes on the rights under the First Amendment).
136. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721 (reversing the Central California District Court’s
ruling in Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d. 872 (2019), that found that the Act was invalid on
its face and as a result dismissed both Count 1 and Count 2 against Defendants).
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A. General Overview of Operative Jurisprudence Employed by
the Ninth Circuit
Defendants maintained that the Act was unconstitutionally
overbroad on its face.137 Attacking the Act, Defendants relied mostly upon
Brandenburg’s imminence requirement; which was also the standard
used by the Ninth Circuit.138 The Ninth Circuit, however, reasoned that
Congress did not intentionally write an unconstitutional law and decided
to sever any unconstitutional language, as opposed to the district court
which invalidated the Act entirely.139 Relying on the United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit stated that “invalidation
for overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be casually employed.” 140
Only upon finding language that violates the First Amendment would the
Ninth Circuit then decide to remove the specific language, while
attempting to keep the Act in its original form.141
1.

The Ninth Circuit’s Deference to Congress

In the beginning of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit made clear it would
give greater deference to Congress when construing the Act’s language. 142
Courts, however, typically use strict scrutiny when interpreting a law that
seeks to regulate a fundamental constitutional right, like the right to
freedom of expression under the First Amendment.143 To survive strict
scrutiny, a law must serve a compelling governmental interest while
137. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
138. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 715.
139. See U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (explaining that a court, when
construing a statute for overly broad language, must appreciate that lawmakers do not
intentionally write legislation to be overbroad or vague, and a court should attempt to
preserve the original intention of the law); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (applying a narrower construction to a New York City’s time,
manner, and place restriction on concert noise can save it from being found
unconstitutional on its face by stating, “[a]ny inadequacy on the face of the guideline
would have been more than remedied by the city's narrowing construction.”).
140. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (establishing a cautious
standard for ruling an Oklahoma statute invalid due to overbreadth and vagueness,
coining the seminal phrase that applying the overbreadth doctrine in order to
invalidate a law was “manifestly, strong medicine. . .”).
141. Rundo II, 990 F. 3d at 714.
142. Id.
143. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (adhering to the Court’s
standard of using strict scrutiny when governments or administrations attempt to
create regulations that are based on a “suspect classification,” namely an individual’s
race); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (striking down a piece
of affirmative action legislation that used race as a factor in prioritizing governmental
spending on contractors to any “minority business” because the government did not
seek to use race-neutral alternatives); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
299-300 (calling for a stricter scrutiny of judicial review, especially when race is
involved as a factor used by the government because of the history of governmental
racial discrimination, the Court elected to carefully review legislation that concerns
fundamental rights or unchangeable characteristics of an individual like race).
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employing the least restrictive means possible.144 Laws that are reviewed
under strict scrutiny rarely survive and are typically invalidated. 145
However, when courts decide that a law is not attempting to regulate a
fundamental constitutional right, they will often allow for a greater
deference to legislators during judicial review.146 A rational basis
standard of review is often employed when reviewing legislation that
seeks to regulate unprotected speech.147 Examples of unprotected speech
range from: inciting imminent unlawful actions, fighting words,
obscenities, as well as defamation.148 Under a rational basis standard of
review, the court seeks to determine whether the government has a
rational reason for its regulation and whether it is employing a
reasonable or rational means to meet its objective.149 Inherently, the First
Amendment is not absolute.150 Even in a democratic society, where the
free exchange of ideas is crucial to a community’s development, the
government still maintains a narrow ability to regulate speech and the
conduct that emanates from that speech.151
The Anti-Riot Act was created to punish individuals that utilize
facilities of interstate commerce to perpetrate or incite a riot.152 From the
144. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to “smoke out” illegitimate governmental actions that may impede a person’s
ability to enjoy a fundamental right); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) (demonstrating that strict scrutiny is necessary due to the United States history
of democratic majorities establishing laws that are inherently discriminatory against
insular minorities that are not equally represented in the political system); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny, “[w]hen a statutory
classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right. . .”).
145. See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (applying the
strict scrutiny test because the statute was considered a content-based restriction
where the Court had stated, “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of
its content will ever be permissible.”).
146. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314 (1976) (explaining that rational-basis standard of
review is a “relatively relaxed” standard and useful in situations where “perfection in
making the [correct statute] is neither possible nor necessary.”).
147. See id. (establishing that under rational-basis standard of review “legislation
is presumed to be valid. . .”); see also Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1051 (9th
Cir. 1989) (providing legislative history in the Ninth Circuit that when a statute “does
not involve a fundamental right or suspect criterion, we apply a rational basis test.”).
148. See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass'n., 564 U.S. at 790-91 (providing a list of
historically unprotected forms of speech, outside the protection of the First
Amendment are “obscenity, incitement, and fighting words”); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (ruling that “defamation” is unprotected speech);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (ruling that “true threats” are
unprotected speech).
149. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 307.
150. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 5 (1971) (explaining that the First
Amendment is the “freedom to believe and freedom to act” and that the government is
permitted to regulate the conduct of an individual).
151. See id. (establishing that the government has a rational interest in regulating
conduct because “[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society.”).
152. See Fern L. Kletter, Federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 2102), 50
A.L.R. Fed. 3d. art. 4 (2020) (detailing the enactment of the Anti-Riot Act was created
to temper and regulate protests and demonstrations in the 1960’s).
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onset, the Act was intended to regulate a person’s conduct, rather than
speech.153 Violations of the Act are determined based on the violating
party committing an overt act. 154 This could include traveling out of state
to take part in a riot or calling another person and telling them to
immediately go commit unlawful violence.155 Unlike the district court that
invalidated the Act in its entirety, the Ninth Circuit construed its language
in a light most favorable to Congress to find majority of the Act
constitutional.156 This deference to Congress is an important initial step
which led to the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s ruling.157
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that the Act did incorporate some
overly broad terms.158 Applying the overbreadth doctrine, the Ninth
Circuit needed to demonstrate the proper reasoning to invalidate
language in the Act.159
2.

The Constitutional Overbreadth Doctrine

The Rundo II court found the Act was not facially overbroad, but
determined the unconstitutional language must be removed for the Act to
comply with the First Amendment.160 The United States Supreme Court
referred toand applied its “overbreadth doctrine” in Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus in 1987.161 The Supreme Court clarified
that the overbreadth doctrine applies to a statute that is facially invalid
because it prohibits a substantial amount of speech.162 To demonstrate
that a law is substantially overbroad, there must be a “realistic danger”
that the statute will infringe on the First Amendment rights of parties not

153. See id. (describing the Act as a means to criminalize the use of interstate
commerce with the intent to complete an overt act such as: (1) inciting a riot, (2)
organizing, promoting, or encouraging participation in a riot, (3) committing any act
of violence in the furtherance of a riot, (4) aiding or abetting any person in inciting or
participating in a riot or committing any act of violence in the furtherance of a riot).
154. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2101(a) (1968).
155. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
156. Rundo II, 990 F. 3d at 716; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481
(2010) (emphasizing a court’s duty “is to seek a reasonable construction of the [federal
Anti-Riot Act] that comports with constitutional requirements.”).
157. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
158. See id. at 719 (finding that terms “urge,” “promote,” and “encourage” a riot
were overbroad but severable from the Act).
159. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (stating that the overbreadth doctrine provides
that “a law may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”)
(internal citations omitted).
160. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 714.
161. See generally Bd. of Airport Comm’r v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987)
(providing an example of an overbroad regulation where the Los Angeles Airport
(LAX) prohibited the use of the airport’s public areas for any type of First Amendment
activity to stop people from handing out pamphlets; the Court ruled that the statute
was overly broad because it would technically punish people for merely having a
conversation).
162. Id.
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before the court to challenge the law as overly broad.163 In other words,
the overbreadth doctrine applies to statutes where a litigating party’s
speech may be constitutionally prohibited by the statute at issue, but the
party is still “permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also
threatens others not before the court.”164 This policy was deemed
essential because individuals, whose expression is constitutionally
protected, “may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
criminal sanctions.”165 The ability for litigants to challenge the law as
overly broad on behalf of third parties not present at trial is crucial to
promoting the exchange of ideas in a democratic society.166
In Rundo II, Defendants had the burden of demonstrating that the
law was overly broad, and thus could not pass constitutional muster.167
Defendants’ main argument was that the Act was facially overbroad and
unconstitutionally infringed on their ability to express their political
views.168 The district court in Rundo I agreed with Defendants’ argument
and found the Act invalid on its face.169 The district court concluded that
the Act did not criminalize conduct “of those in the heat of a riot.” 170
Insisting that the Act was overly broad, the district court agreed with
Defendants’ analysis that the Act punished conduct that was outside the
scope of either “inciting a riot” or “riot[ing],” in general.171 The out-ofscope conduct, as noted in Rundo I, were activities such as using a credit
card, posting on social media, and sending text messages to other RAM
members.172 This conduct, Defendants argued, was exhibited by every
law-abiding citizen, and demonstrates that the Act was overly broad
because it would have the potential to punish those who were not in
violation of the Act.173

163. See generally Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
799 (1984) (expressing the overbreadth doctrine as a crucial means to allow parties
whose speech is unprotected to still challenge a statute for being overly broad in order
to protect citizens who either do not know their First Amendment rights are being
infringed upon or have already elected not to exercise their rights out of fear of being
prosecuted).
164. See Broadwich v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (establishing that when a
statute is overly broad, a court should attempt to narrow its interpretation in order to
comply with constitutional standards, the Court explained that this remedy was out of
concern that the threat of enforcing an overly broad statute would chill
constitutionally protected speech).
165. Id.
166. See generally Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (ruling a Georgia
statute overly broad when it purported to punish lawful and protected speech by
punishing, “[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in
his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of
the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
167. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.
168. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 713.
169. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
170. Id. at 877.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed.174 However, the court did establish that
provisions of the Act could still be considered overly broad if they did not
comply with the imminence requirement laid out in Brandenburg.175 To
protect lawful expression, Brandenburg established that if a statute did
not make a distinction between speech that “merely advocated” for
violence, or speech used to “prepare a group” to incite imminent unlawful
action, it would infringe on protected speech and be rendered
unconstitutional.176
The idea of imminence permeates from speech that is intended to
“prepare” or compel a group to violence.177 The Brandenburg Court was
attempting to strike a proper balance between an individual simply
teaching others and advocating for violence versus actually preparing a
group to commit violent acts.178 Defendants argued that the Act’s
overbreadth essentially punished speech and conduct that would not
result in “incitement to imminent unlawful actions,” like renting a car
with a credit card or posting on social media.179 Consistent with the
Brandenburg imminence requirement, the Ninth Circuit determined,
though the Act was not facially overbroad, it did include provisions that
violated Brandenburg.180 The court found that some provisions could be
considered overbroad because they would effectively punish lawful
speech and actions.181 By construing the contested provisions in the Act,
the Ninth Circuit severed the unconstitutional language.182
3.

The Severability Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit decided to sever the unconstitutional language

174. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721 (citing the overbreadth doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
viewed the Act in a light most favorable to Congress, ultimately disagreeing with the
district court’s invalidation of the entire statute and elected to use the doctrine of
severability).
175. Id. at 713; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48 (employing the
Brandenburg imminence requirement which stated in two parts: (1) advocating for
violence must be directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and (2) is
likely to incite or produce such action).
176. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
177. Id. at 444; see generally Hess, 414 U.S. at 108 (ruling that an individual yelling
at a police officer during a protest that they would comeback at a later time clearly did
not rise to the level of imminence necessary to comply with the Brandenburg
imminence requirement); Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 990 (following
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court upholds the use of the Brandenburg imminence
requirement by reversing a decision that claimed that punishing an individual who did
not “boycott” a hardware store was merely speculative and speculation on whether or
not violence will actually occur does not meet the Court’s imminence requirement).
178. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
179. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (using the activities of Defendants that
brought them into violation of the Act, the district court interprets the statute as overly
broad because every American citizen can engage in these activities).
180. Rundo II, 990 F. 3d at 719.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 720.
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from the Act after denying that it was overly broad on its face.183
Severability of legislation is a powerful tool granted to a court under its
inherent powers of judicial review.184 However, it is not without limits. 185
Specifically, a court cannot “rewrite a statute and give it an effect
altogether different [than it was originally intended]” and after severing
the unconstitutional provisions from a law, the court must ensure it
remains operative.186 To correctly “sever” a law, a court will first declare
the provision unconstitutional, using substantive constitutional
doctrine.187 Next, and only after deciding that a provision in a statute is
unconstitutional, the court determines whether the remainder of the
statute can stand.188
As explained above, the Ninth Circuit’s substantive constitutional
standard in determining the validity of the Act was determined in
Brandenburg.189 The Brandenburg imminence requirement has two
parts.190 First, the speaker must have the requisite intent to incite
imminent unlawful action.191 Second, even if the speaker exhibits the
requisite intent, there must be a likelihood that imminent unlawful action
will actually occur.192 Initially in its analysis, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
the actual language of the Act to determine if there were any provisions
or language that did not meet the Brandenburg imminence
requirement.193 The court narrowed its review to the provisions of the
Act that were contested by Defendants.194 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit
found provisions in the Act that violated Brandenburg’s imminence
standard because they infringed on freedom of expression rights under
the First Amendment.195

B. The Ninth Circuits Analysis of the Anti-Riot Act
The Ninth Circuit found and severed the overbroad provisions that
did not comply with the Brandenburg imminence requirement because
the provisions punished a substantial amount of protected speech.196 The
183. Id.
184. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-59 (2005) (demonstrating
guidelines to the severability doctrine when the Court determined a statute that set
“sentencing guidelines” did not have to be completely invalidated for being
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment but could be severed of its
unconstitutional language).
185. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (establishing that the Court
“must refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.”).
186. Booker, 543 U.S. at 332 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 713.
190. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Rundo II, 990 F. 3d at 714.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 721.
196. Id. at 714.
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Ninth Circuit took three pertinent steps in construing the validity of the
Act. First, as previously mentioned, the court looked to both the Seventh
and Fourth Circuits to define the overt act provisions as a whole. 197
Second, by focusing on the Act’s same overt act provisions, the Ninth
Circuit broke down the relevant words in § 2101(a)(1)-(4) to scrutinize
the language and determine whether it comports with Brandenburg’s
imminence requirement.198 Third, the court turned to § 2102(b) to
examine the definition provided by Congress to describe its meaning “to
incite a riot.”199
1.

Defining the Overt Act Provisions as a Whole

Defendants asserted that all the overt provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional because the provisions were “too far removed in time
from any riot” to meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement.200
Defendants argued that the use of “overt acts” in the Act was synonymous
with overt acts for a conspiracy statute.201 Analogous with crimes
involving a conspiracy, the defendant must have committed an overt act.
202 The type of overt act involved in a conspiracy does not need an
“immediate connection to the intended crime.”203 Defendants wanted to
establish that the Act’s overt act provisions did not meet the Brandenburg
imminence requirement because the provisions were similar to overt acts
in conspiracy cases that do not have a temporal requirement.204 If
successful, Defendants could have insisted that the court declare the Act
invalid on its face.205
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and looked to both the Seventh and
Fourth Circuits to adopt a proffered approach to the overt act
provisions.206 An approach initially reviewed by the Ninth Circuit came
out of a similar Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Miselis.207 The Fourth
Circuit decided that the overt act provisions were similar to overt acts
regarding an attempt statute.208 Under attempt statutes, an overt act
would be considered a “substantial step” taken in the completion of a
197. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2101(a) (1968).
198. Id. at 716-17.
199. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968) (defining “‘to incite a riot’ or ‘to organize,
promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot,’ includes, but is not limited to,
urging or instigating other persons to riot, but shall not be deemed to mean the oral or
written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief, not involving advocacy of any
act or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of, or the right to commit, any such
act or acts.”).
200. Rundo II, at 715.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1994).
204. Rundo II, 990 F. 3d at 719.
205. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
206. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 361-62
(7th Cir. 1972); Miselis, 972 F.3d at 534-35.
207. Miselis, 972 F.3d at 518.
208. Id. at 534.
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crime.209 In other words, the Fourth Circuit associated the overt act
provisions as “substantial steps” where an individual’s conduct to either
organize, aid, or commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot
violated the Act.210 The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach, however,
because considering the overt act provisions as mere “substantial steps”
did not resolve the Brandenburg imminence requirement issue.211 Unlike
conspiracy or attempt statutes, to satisfy Brandenburg, the person’s
conduct must be directed and have a likelihood of inciting imminent
unlawful action.212 In the case of attempt, an individual’s “substantial
step,” or significant conduct to complete a crime, does not have to be
moments before the crime is committed.213 By utilizing the “substantial
step” approach from attempt statutes, the Fourth Circuit “sidestep[ped]”
the imminence issue altogether.214
The Ninth Circuit instead adopted the approach of the Seventh
Circuit.215 Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the overt act provisions
are not “substantial steps,” but can reasonably be considered goals
achieved by a person’s conduct “or are themselves the required overt
acts.”216 Here, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the overt act provisions to
mean that any person, while traveling in interstate commerce or using the
facilities of interstate commerce, commits an “overt act” by actually
inciting a riot, committing an act of violence, or aiding any person in
inciting a riot.217
The Ninth Circuit appreciated this “goal” approach, as it made the
crucial connection between an individual’s speech and its conduct.218 This
“goal” approach satisfies the Brandenburg imminence requirement
because conduct that is intended “to incite a riot” satisfies the requisite
imminent threat element.219 Through the adoption of the Seventh
Circuit’s approach, the Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant’s argument. 220
The court decided that the overt act provisions were constitutional under
the First Amendment.221
2.

Overbroad terms in § 2101(a)(1)-(4) of the Act

Once the Ninth Circuit determined that as a whole the overt act

209. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 (2007).
210. Miselis, 972 F.3d at 534.
211. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
212. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
213. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 107.
214. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
215. Id.
216. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361 (interpreting the overt act provisions as “goals”
to be achieved, meaning the Act punishes conduct that is “intentionally and
successfully causing a riot as a criminal offense.”).
217. Id. at 362.
218. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
219. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361.
220. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.
221. Id.
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provisions complied with Brandenburg, the court turned to the individual
provisions themselves.222 Defendants claimed that subparagraphs (1),
(2), and (4) under § 2101(a) were overbroad.223 Again, the Defendants
maintained that because the Act punished a substantial amount of
protected speech, it was invalid under the First Amendment. 224 In this
instance, both Defendants and the district court determined that the Act
criminalized words such as “organize,” “promote,” and “encourage.” 225
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, in part, that the language that encompassed
the overt act provisions were overly broad and did not meet the
Brandenburg imminence requirement.226 The Ninth Circuit found that the
language in subparagraphs (1) inciting a riot, (3) committing any act of
violence to further a riot, and (4) aiding and abetting any person in
furtherance of a riot of § 2101(a), met the proper imminence standard in
Brandenburg.227 Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s “goal” approach, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the overt act provisions are, themselves, goals that
were intended to be achieved by a violating party’s conduct. 228
Brandenburg requires that the individual’s conduct rise to a likelihood of
creating an imminent incitement to a riot.229 Inciting an actual riot,
committing an act of violence, and aiding or abetting another person to
perpetrate a riot, all meet the definition of conduct that creates an
imminent incitement of unlawful action or riot.230 Through its analysis of
§ 2101(a)(1), (3), and (4), the Ninth Circuit ruled that the specific
subparagraphs complied with the First Amendment.231
However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Defendants that the terms to
“organize,” “promote,” and “encourage” a riot were overly broad and
infringed on a substantial amount of speech.232 The court noted that in
Brandenburg, the Supreme Court decided the term “organize” infringed
upon a substantial amount of speech because an individual may organize
a group of people for a multitude of situations, not all resulting in
organizing to incite a riot.233 The Act’s use of “encourage” and “promote”
fell under the same category of language that could not be distinguished
between “mere advocacy” versus “preparing a group for unlawful

222. Id.
223. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 878.
224. Id. at 880.
225. Id.
226. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
227. Id.
228. See id. (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s “goal” approach to the overt act
provisions).
229. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
230. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
231. Id.
232. Miselis, 972 F.3d at 537.
233. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 (holding that the speaker, the leader of the
KKK rally, had merely stated that the meeting was an “organizers’ meeting,” the Court
determined that at the moment of the KKK leaders’ speech there was not an imminent
threat of danger).
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action.”234 The Ninth Circuit used United States v. Williams 235 to illustrate
how the Supreme Court made clear that an individual “encouraging”
another to do something was akin to “abstract advocacy” and does not
satisfy the imminent incitement to violence required under
Brandenburg.236 Consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the terms “organize,” “encourage,” and “promote”
were unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.237
3.

Congress’s Definition § 2102(b) of “Incite a Riot” Does Not Meet
Brandenburg

Defendants also attacked the Act’s definitions of “riot” and “to incite
a riot.”238 The definition of “riot” under the Act encompassed any public
disturbance involving acts of violence or threats of violence by one or
more people.239 The Act’s definition of a “riot” was held constitutional
because it was based solely on conduct, not speech.240 The Ninth Circuit
then turned to the definition of the term “to incite a riot” listed under §
2102(b) finding that it could be severed of unconstitutional language that
did not meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement.241 The Ninth
Circuit pointed to three phrases that required the court’s scrutiny: (1) “to
organize, promote, encourage,” (2) “urging or instigating,” and (3)
“advocacy of any acts or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of or
the right to commit, any such acts.”242 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
limited its meaning of the words in § 2102(b) to only the definitions
contained in the statute because the Act defined the terms. 243
Similar to § 2101(a), the terms “organize,” “promote,” and
“encourage,” made another appearance in the Act and the court was quick
to rule them unconstitutional.244 Under the definition “to incite a riot,” an
individual who is merely promoting, organizing, or encouraging a riot did
not rise to the level of imminent threat of unlawful action to meet the
Brandenburg standard.245

234. See id. at 445 (establishing that merely teaching a group about violence does
not constitute an incitement to imminent unlawful actions).
235. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303 (2008) (establishing that even
though the statute infringed on protected speech of law-abiding citizens, the Court was
able to narrow the construction, or scope, of the legislation to an interpretation that
only punished individuals who possessed child pornography would be punished under
the statute).
236. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
237. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
238. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102).
239. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968).
240. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
241. Id. at 716.
242. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(a)(1)-(4)(1968).
243. Id. at 716-17.
244. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968).
245. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 716.

2022]

Applying the Anti-Riot Act: From Antifa to Insurrectionists

a.

167

The Term “Urging” versus “Instigating” under Brandenburg

The Ninth Circuit also looked at the definition of the term
“urging.”246 Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Miselis, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the definition of “urging” was to “encourage, advocate,
recommend, or advise . . . earnestly and with persistence.” 247 Once again,
relying on the Brandenburg imminence standard, the court found that
when an individual is merely encouraging others to commit violence, it
does not reach the level of an imminent danger of a riot.248 The court
decided that an individual’s speech may “encourage” others to do both
lawful and unlawful activities.249 As a result, there is a substantial amount
of protected speech when someone merely encourages or urges another
person.250
In contrast, the court found that the term “instigating” did comply
with the Brandenburg imminence requirement.251 The court
demonstrated that if an individual is to “instigate” a riot, that person’s
speech and conduct would be to “provoke” or compel others to act.252 As
a result, there is inherently a greater likelihood that unlawful action has
already taken place when an individual’s speech is responsible for
“instigating” others to start a riot.253 The Ninth Circuit explained that even
though both “urging” and “instigating” are located in the same provision
in the Act, one term can be deemed constitutional while the other is
deemed unconstitutionally overbroad.254
b.

The Limitation on Expression of Belief in § 2102(b)(2)

In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that a statute that seeks to
regulate unprotected speech, through a content-based restriction, must
make a clear distinction between speech that is intended to “merely
advocate for violence,” and speech that is intended to “prepare a group”
for imminent unlawful action.255 In drafting the Act, Congress desired to
establish that the law would not apply to the oral or written expression

246. Id. at 717.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. Brandenburg, 397 U.S. at 447.
249. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 717; see also Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-109 (explaining that
the Indiana statute was overly broad when defendant was being accused of incitement
of imminent unlawful conduct when he merely exclaimed to a police officer “’[w]e’ll
take the [f**king] street later. . .’”).
250. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 717.
251. Id. at 716-17.
252. Id. at 716.
253. Brandenburg, 397 U.S. at 447.
254. See Rundo II, 990 U.S. at 717 (displaying deference to Congress to determine
that only “urging” need to be removed from the sentence and that Congress did not
intentionally write the provision to include one term that met Brandenburg and one
that did not); 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (incorporating both “instigating” and “urging” in the
same provision).
255. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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that either reveals “advocacy of ideas” or “expression of belief.” 256 In
compliance with Brandenburg, the Act differentiates between advocating
or expressing a belief and the type of speech intended to propel the
audience to imminent unlawful action.257
The Act, however, placed an unconstitutional limitation on a
person’s right to advocate or express ideas.258 The limitation prohibits the
advocacy of “any act or acts of violence” or any “assertion of the rightness
of, or the right to commit” any acts of violence.259 This added limitation
violates Brandenburg.260 The Brandenburg court explicitly allowed for the
advocacy of violence, so long as the speech is not “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action” and there is no likelihood of the
speech actually producing unlawful action.261 The Act then infringes on
an individual’s ability to express beliefs of violence or of rioting when the
expression is merely advocating for violence but does not have a true
chance of actually occurring.262 An individual’s ability to simply advocate
for the “rightness or the right to commit” violence is still protected under
the right to the freedom of expression under the First Amendment. 263
Finding that the limiting statement infringed on a substantial amount of
protected speech, the Ninth Circuit decided to sever the entire phrase
from the Act.264

C. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Rundo II
In its unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit decided to reverse and
remand Rundo II back to the district court.265 The court established that
the Act was not facially overbroad and should not have been
invalidated.266 As a remedy, the court decided to “salvage” the Act through
severance.267 As explained above, the Ninth Circuit had determined, from
the onset, that invalidating Congressional legislation was “strong

256. Kletter, supra note 152, at 4.
257. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 720.
258. Id.
259. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b)(2).
260. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 718.
261. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721 (severing the Act, the Ninth Circuit restated §
2102(b) as “‘to incite a riot’ or participate in, or carry on a riot, includes, but is not
limited to instigating other persons to riot, but shall not be deemed to mean the oral
or written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief. . .”).
265. Id. at 721.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 720-21 (restating § 2101(a)(1)-(4) as “(a) Whoever travels in
interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce,
including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with
intent (1) to incite a riot; or (2) participate in, or carry on a riot; or (3) to commit any
act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or (4) to aid or abet any person in inciting or
participating in or carrying on a riot or committing any act of violence in furtherance
of a riot. . .”).
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medicine” not to be used indiscriminately.268 Still, the court was able to
find unconstitutionally overbroad language in the Act and remove it
without destroying the original intent of Congress: to prosecute citizens
that use interstate commerce to incite riots.269 In ruling to “salvage” the
Act through severing its unconstitutional language, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Defendants’ overbreadth argument.270 In upholding the Act
as facially constitutional, the Ninth Circuit further rejected the
Defendants’ claim that their speech was protected under the heckler’s
veto doctrine.271
1.

Defendant’s Application of the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine is Not
Relevant to the Act

Defendants’ final contention was that the Act violated the heckler’s
veto doctrine.272 The Ninth Circuit summarized the heckler’s veto as an
unconstitutional content-based speech restriction where the speaker is
silenced because their message has the potential to cause a violent
reaction from the audience.273 The court simply determined that the
doctrine did not apply to the Act.274 The doctrine is only applicable to a
speaker’s message or subject matter where the speaker cannot be held
responsible for a hostile mob’s reaction to its speech.275 The court
illustrated this point by requiring an individual, through the means of
interstate commerce, to perform an overt act such as aiding and abetting
another person to incite a riot or an act of violence to find a violation of
the Act.276 The heckler’s veto doctrine, in contrast, is similar to fighting
words.277 Here, the Act is geared to criminalize the conduct of a speaker
268. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721; see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293
(2008) (stating “[i]nvalidation for overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be
casually employed.”).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 718.
271. Id. at 719.
272. See Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158 (comparing fighting words and unprotected
speech, the heckler’s veto doctrine is determinative based on the reaction of an
audience, where, in contrast, the Act is determinative of an individual’s conduct while
using interstate commerce).
273. Id.
274. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
275. Rosenbaum, 484 F.3d at 1158.
276. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 715; see Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361-62. (distinguishing an
overt act as purely conduct, and which conduct is not reliant on the reaction of a hostile
audience).
277. See generally R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (establishing that a
governmental regulation cannot pick and choose which type, or subject-matter falls
under a statute that prohibits the use of fighting words; as a result would be considered
an unconstitutional, content-based restriction); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as words which “by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” where defendant had
called a police officer a “fascist”); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949) (defining
fighting words as speech that “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a
condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. . .”).
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through its overt act provisions and does not rely upon any reaction from
an audience.278 The Ninth Circuit, in finding that the heckler’s veto
doctrine did not apply, ultimately rejected Defendant’s assertion that
their conduct was protected expression. 279
2.

The Ninth Circuit’s Final Thoughts on Reversal

In its closing remarks, the Ninth Circuit mentioned that protecting
the First Amendment is of the “utmost importance in maintaining a truly
free society.”280 The court recognized that the Act’s purpose was to allow
society to strike the proper balance by allowing speech, even if it contains
perceived or speculative violence, while attempting to protect citizens
from riots.281 A government that overreaches and denies speech
prematurely to stop violence too soon is just as dangerous to society as
stopping violent behavior too late. 282 The Act, after the court severed its
language to meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement, can be a tool
used by the government, for the people, to prevent individuals from
inciting unlawful actions.283

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
This section will provide an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Rundo II.284 First, it will comment on the ruling reached by the Ninth
Circuit, and how the court missed an important opportunity to extend its
decision to bar the federal government’s use of the Act on social media
posts that do not meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement.285
Second, this section will discuss why individual states should decide how
to protect the freedom of non-violent protests and prevent riots. By
continuing the analysis of the Act and its history, this section will discuss
when the Act should be considered applicable law. Finally, the analysis
will consider the future outlook of the Act following the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Rundo II.286

278. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Kletter, supra note 152, at 4 (discussing the social upheaval of the 1960s
which led Congress to enacting the Act, was also attempting to create the proper
balance between policing violent protests while not infringing on First Amendment
rights).
282. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721; see generally United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140
S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (explaining that if the government steps in too soon to prevent
speech from happening, it will result in a chilling effect on First Amendment rights).
283. Rundo II, 990 F.3d. at 721.
284. Id.
285. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
286. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
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A. Analysis of Rundo II
Though the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to reverse and remand the case
back to the district court was correct, the Ninth Circuit could have
extended its analysis into whether or not, as a whole, the Act could be
used to prosecute individuals like the Defendants in Rundo II.287 The Ninth
Circuit correctly decided under the Brandenburg imminence test to sever
the unconstitutional language from the Act. However, the federal
government overstepped its enumerated powers by prosecuting
Defendants when they purportedly did not leave the state of California. 288
The Ninth Circuit should have rejected the government’s argument that
Defendants’ use of social media violated the Act because it did not meet
the Brandenburg imminence requirement289 and was “merely advocacy
of ideas.”290
1.

The Ninth Circuit Correctly Severed the Unconstitutional
Language from the Act

Finding that the Act was not facially unconstitutional, the Ninth
Circuit turned to the severability doctrine to bring the Act into the
Brandenburg imminence requirement.291 Ultimately, this was the right
decision. As stated in United States v. Williams, declaring a Congressional
statute completely invalid is “strong medicine.”292 The Ninth Circuit was
prudent in giving greater deference to Congress because it upholds the
legitimacy of both Congress and the court’s inherent power of judicial
review.293 In other words, when a court, for any number of reasons,
287. Id.
288. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010) (stating “[t]he Federal
Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers, which means
that every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of those powers”
granted by the Constitution); U.S. CONST. art. I (detailing the enumerated powers
granted to Congress). See also Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876 (reporting that
Defendants traveled to political rallies in Huntington Beach, California; Berkeley,
California; and San Bernardino California).
289. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (establishing the Brandenburg imminence
requirement where: (1) advocacy of the use of force, or of law violation, is “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and (2) “is likely to incite or produce
such action.”); Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (finding that the Act “criminalizes acts
taken long before any crowd gathers, or acts that have only an attenuated connection
to any riot…”).
290. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2102(b) (1968) (severing the exception to written and oral
advocacy cannot involve “advocacy of any act or acts of violence, or assertion of the
rightness of, or the right to commit, any such act or acts,” the Ninth Circuit failed to rule
on whether Defendants social media use, under the new version of § 2102(b), violated
the Act).
291. Rundo II, 990 U.S. at 720.
292. Williams, 553 U.S. at 293.
293. See William R. MacKay, Legitimacy in a Federal System, 2 FED. GOVERNANCE 1, 2
(2005) (explaining, “[a]t a minimum, legitimacy entails governmental action that is
consistent with the rule of law,” where Congress cannot start adjudicating cases, and
the Supreme Court cannot begin writing original legislation).

172

UIC Law Review

[56:141

decides to simply strike an entire piece of legislation, it is essentially
saying to the legislature that it did not write an effective law. 294
Congressional legitimacy is an important principle in a
representative democracy because citizens elect federal representatives
to create laws that are theoretically meant to meet our needs and
concerns.295 If the unelected federal judiciary were able to merely strike
down these laws, the courts would be overstepping the enumerated
powers granted under Article III of the Constitution.296 The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence, especially Williams, acknowledges that for a
federalist system to work, each branch must not overstep its own
enumerated powers.297
The doctrine of severability strikes the proper balance between
upholding a statute by removing any unconstitutional language and
respecting legislative powers.298 In Rundo II, the Ninth Circuit was
astutely aware that the district court was overstepping its powers by
striking down the Act as unconstitutional on its face.299 The Ninth Circuit
showed proper restraint by not simply invalidating the Act as
unconstitutional and relying upon Brandenburg as the standard in
analyzing the Act. Applying Brandenburg to the Act, the Ninth Circuit
correctly held that provisions that criminalize individuals for
“organizing,” “urging,” or “encouraging” were overly broad.300
For example, if one “organized” a group of reasonable people and
“encouraged” or “urged” them to walk into a burning building, what is the
likelihood they would do so? This elementary example is analogous to
facts that would not meet the Brandenburg imminence requirement.
These terms do not inherently lend themselves to requiring “compulsion”
or immediate action.301 On the other hand, if one were to “provoke” or
“instigate” a group of people to burn down a building, by the definitions
of the terms, one would have already set the group into motion. 302 The
294 Id.
295. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 469-70
(2006) (stating that “this Court has concluded that our system of representative
democracy is premised on the assumption that elected officials will seek to represent
their constituency as a whole, rather than any dominant faction.”).
296. U.S. CONST. art. III.
297. See United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. 255, 261 (1951) (defining
“enumerated powers” as the powers of the federal government specifically mentioned
in the United States Constitution, as well as those that are implied, or implicitly
granted, through legal precedents or derived out of necessity).
298. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24 (acknowledging that the need to sever
Congressional legislation should be a final option, after the court attempts to narrowly
construe the statute to meet constitutional requirements).
299. Id. (referencing Supreme Court precedence, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
the Central District Court of California’s approach when it failed to follow the proper
steps after declaring that the Act was unconstitutional by not attempting to sever the
unconstitutional language).
300. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (establishing that speech that is a “mere
abstract teaching” is not considered unprotected speech); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2102.
301. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361 (defining terms under the Brandenburg
imminence test that “require the element of propelling the action” as constitutional).
302. Id.

2022]

Applying the Anti-Riot Act: From Antifa to Insurrectionists

173

Ninth Circuit found this nuance in the Act’s language and correctly
removed the overbroad language.
2.

The Ninth Circuit Failed to Extend Its Ruling

Severing the overly broad language from the Act was necessary, yet
the Ninth Circuit failed to address whether or not the Act should apply to
Defendants in Rundo II.303 The district court in Rundo I repeatedly
mentioned that the Defendants’ conduct did not meet the imminence
requirement set forth in Brandenburg.304 It rejected the government’s
argument when the court found Defendants’ use of social media posts
were written either months before or weeks after the Defendants
attended the proffered political rallies.305 The district court was correct
in finding that the Defendants’ conduct, though abhorrent, was not
punishable under the Act.306
Even as social media continues to evolve rapidly, the United States
legal system continues to move at a methodical, seemingly intentional,
pace.307 In Rundo II,308 the government stated that the internet was a
facility of commerce.309 However, expanding the list of the “facilities of
interstate commerce” to include the internet is an issue in and of itself.
Another concerning aspect of the government’s argument in Rundo I was
its attempt to use Defendants’ social media posts as reasons to prosecute
them under the Act.310 It is unacceptable under the First Amendment to
allow the government to look through citizens’ social media posts and
303. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
304. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 872 (2019); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
305. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 877-78 (finding that Defendants’ overt acts
specified in the government’s indictment ranged from: (1) a RAM member held a
conference call three months before any political rally; (2) Defendant Boman posted a
news article on Facebook a day after the Huntington Beach political rally, (3) several
weeks before the Berkeley rally, Defendant Eason texted RAM members about
attending the political rally to provide “security;” (4) nine days before the San
Bernardino rally, a RAM member shared photographs on Facebook of signs that RAM
members planned to carry; and (5) three days after the San Bernardino rally, RAM
members sent text message boasting about how beat Antifa)(emphasis added).
306. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 880 (explaining the court did not condone
RAM’s hateful and toxic ideology, but the government has sufficient means “to prevent
and punish such behavior without sacrificing the First Amendment.”).
307. See Abigail Johnson Hess, Experts Say 23% of Lawyers’ Work can be
Automated—Law Schools are Trying to Stay Ahead of the Curve, CNBC (Feb. 18, 2020,
5:30 AM), www.cnbc.com/2020/02/06/technology-is-changing-the-legal-professionand-law-schools.html [perma.cc/3NZ7-JH8D] (describing the innovations in
technology and their effects on the legal profession, while social media companies like
Facebook have already created a “virtual reality” portal that someday could enable
lawyers the ability to meet with clients “face-to-face” without leaving their law firms);
Introducing Meta: A Social Technology Company, FACEBOOK (Oct. 28, 2021),
www.about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta
[perma.cc/PD4G-MMJK] (introducing the “metaverse,” Facebook’s latest innovation
and its new parent company, Meta).
308. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
309. Id. at 708.
310. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d. at 877.
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“select” the messages it found to bolster its criminal indictments. 311
Social media is very much the marketplace of ideas, akin to what the
public square was at the founding of this nation.312 The government has
been preempted, numerous times, from trying to regulate any viewpoints
or subject-matter through content-based restrictions.313 Here, the Ninth
Circuit had a great opportunity to establish that the government’s
argument in Rundo II, connecting Defendants’ social media posts to the
Act, would be a clear content-based restriction violation.314

B. Prosecuting Defendants at the State Level and Applying
the Act Narrowly
The proposed solutions are simple: allow the states through their
powers under the Tenth Amendment to prosecute defendants for their
violent conduct. Enforcing federal legislation narrowly and reserving it
for situations that call for the application of federal law is crucial in
legitimizing the legislative power granted to Congress under the
Constitution.315 Also, narrowing the scope of the Act is important because
each state has its own unique set of cultures, ideas, and movements within
them, often brought about by social media.316 The federal government
should not be able to overstep its enumerated powers to cast a “blanket”
policy over protests in every individual state. Today, it is easy for the
majority of Americans to look at the actions and viewpoints of RAM
members as detrimental to society. However, the First Amendment
applies to all of our expressions equally, from the most progressive to the
most hateful.317
311. See id. at 876 (explaining how the government, in building its case against the
Defendants, selected a particular social media post that it deemed demonstrated the
Defendants’ violent tendencies as unconvincing evidence).
312. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1519, 1523 (2019) (providing that ideas on social media are in a better position, preinternet, to be “allowed to compete freely in an unregulated market” where “the best
ideas will ultimately get accepted.”); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(introducing the metaphor “marketplace of ideas” and that the proper way to “test the
truth” was to allow ideas to be exposed to the “competition of the market.”).
313. See generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (overruling
city restriction prohibiting adult theaters based solely on the content and subjectmatter of the business); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 174 (2015) (overturning
sign restriction that singled out and prohibited signs based on content and subjectmatter of the sign); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1750 (2017) (overruling United
States Patent and Trademark Office policy that discriminated against the content or
subject-matter of the name incorporated into an applicant’s trademark application).
314. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 709 (2021).
315.
See
Ian
Hurd,
Legitimacy,
ENCYCL.
PRINCETONIENSIS,
pesd.princeton.edu/node/516 [perma.cc/6AQ7-A2PA] (last visited Aug. 20, 2022)
(explaining that “[l]egitimacy is commonly defined in political science and sociology as
the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern.”).
316. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) (stating that the “[Supreme Court]
has ‘long recognized the role of the States as laboratories for devising solutions to
difficult legal problems’” to suit that particular state’s requirements).
317. See MIGHTY IRA (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 2020)
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Leave it to the States’ Police Powers to Prevent Riots

It took fifty-three years after the signing of the Anti-Riot Act in 1968
for the Ninth Circuit to find that the Act incorporated unconstitutional
language.318 Even though the standard the Ninth Circuit used in
determining which language violated the First Amendment was handed
down by the Supreme Court in 1969. 319 As previously mentioned, the Act
has been discussed by other circuits.320 However, after United States v.
Dellinger, the famous “Chicago Seven” trial, the Act became dormant. 321
The answer is that states already possess their own criminal penal
codes.322 States have been and continue to be well equipped to handle
both the protection of non-violent protests and the prevention of riots. 323
The Central District of California in Rundo I was correct in stating
that the state of California should be allowed to prosecute the Defendants,
not the federal government.324 The Defendants here are white
supremacists.325 They used social media to spread hate.326 However, as
the district court stated, their postings occurred too far before or after
any political rally they disrupted to meet the Brandenburg imminence
requirement.327 Defendants harassed, sought out, chased, and assaulted
California citizens.328 California is well within its state police powers,
granted under the Tenth Amendment, to properly bring these RAM
members to justice.329
(recounting American Civil Liberties Union defense of American Nazi’s right to protest
in Skokie, Illinois, and the importance of defending the “right,” not the “motive” of the
individual).
318. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 719 (finding that “the Act criminalizes a substantial
amount of protected speech”); Wiener v. F.B.I., 943 F.2d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 1991)
(regarding only the “very broad” nature of the Anti-Riot Act, but the Ninth Circuit does
not evaluate the Act’s unconstitutionality which demonstrates the lack of prior case
law leading to a revival of the Act in 2019).
319. See Recent Case, supra note 42 (describing the federal Anti-Riot Act’s
“reemergence” as prosecutors begin to use the Act to indict violent protestors).
320. See generally Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 340 (analyzing the Act in the famous
“Chicago Seven” case after riots took place in Chicago. Illinois, during the 1968
Democratic National Convention); Miselis, 972 F.3d at 518 (discussing the
constitutionality of the Act after Michael Miselis, with other RAM members, committed
violent attacks on counter protesters at political rallies).
321. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361-62; See also Recent Case, supra note 42.
322. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
323. See id. at 880 (advocating for both the states and the federal government to
look to other legislation besides the Act, however, the court went on to invalidate the
Act entirely; which was a factor in suggesting different federal statutes).
324. See id. (stating that “law enforcement has its pick of statutes to employ
towards these ends.”).
325. See id at 876 (describing Defendants’ organization, “RAM [as] a ‘combatready, militant group of a new nationalist white supremacy and identity movement.’”).
326. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 713.
327. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
328. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 713.
329. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (Deering 2021) (inciting a riot); CAL. PENAL CODE §
405 (Deering 2021) (participating in a riot).
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A reasonable argument against the use of California’s Penal Codes is
that they may not allow the government to seek a higher yearly sentence
as opposed to the five years a defendant under the Act could receive. 330
However, in this case, the Defendants were not said to have traveled out
of state but were being prosecuted for using the facilities of interstate
commerce.331 The issue with the indictments brought by the federal
government are that they do not show or accuse Defendants of traveling
outside of California.332
Overall, the government’s argument is weakened because the
Defendants’ use of the facilities of commerce were either through a credit
card, using the telephone, or using the internet.333 The district court in
Rundo I correctly found that Defendants’ conduct did not meet the
imminence requirement laid out in Brandenburg.334 However, there are
plenty of examples where other defendants traveled across state lines to
either take part in or incite a riot; one such incident was the January 6th
Insurrection at the United States Capitol.335
2.

Apply the Act Narrowly: Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol

On January 6, 2021, our nation witnessed an attack on our
democracy from within.336 The federal Anti-Riot Act, at its very essence,
was created for this exact situation. Similar to RAM members in Rundo II,
a clear majority of the insurrectionists believed in right-wing ideologies
and resided in areas of the country where they would be considered
political minorities.337 However, unlike Defendants in Rundo II, the
insurrectionists’ expression met the Brandenburg imminence
requirement and was thus unprotected by the First Amendment. 338
330. See id. (the penalties under the California Penal Codes for “participating in a
riot” or “inciting a riot” is one year as opposed to the Act’s five year sentence,
demonstrating a motivation for government officials to attempt to prosecute under the
Act to increase sentence length).
331. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 875 (reciting both Count One and Count Two
of Defendants’ indictments).
332. See id. (establishing that Defendants were being charged with unlawful
conduct while attending political rallies in: Huntington Beach, CA; Berkeley, CA; and
San Bernardino, CA).
333. See id. at 877 (finding that the Act “does not just criminalize the behavior of
those in the heat of a riot . . . no violence even need[s] to occur . . .. [a] defendant could
be convicted for renting a car with a credit card, posting about a political rally on
Facebook, or texting friends about when to meet…”).
334. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
335. See Brian Duignan, United States Capitol Attack of 2021, BRITANNICA (Aug. 4,
2021),
www.britannica.com/event/United-States-Capitol-attack-of-2021
[perma.cc/A6J2-4WDM] (recording the events that took place on January 6th, 2021,
also referred to as the Insurrection of the U.S. Capitol).
336. Id.
337. Sam Cabral & Roderick Macleod, Capitol Riots: Five Takeaways from the
Arrests, BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2021), www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55987603
[perma.cc/UC67-TGNY] (profiling apprehended insurrectionists as right-wing and
coming from areas of the country that were more “blue” as opposed to “red”).
338. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
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The concerns of Rundo I and II courts were not present here because
Defendants did not purportedly leave the state of California to attend
their political rallies. 339 On the other hand, many of the insurrectionists
used interstate commerce to fly or drive across state lines to Washington
D.C.340 Second, though Defendants are guilty of breaking California Penal
Codes, their social media content did not rise to the imminence
requirement under Brandenburg.341 However, the insurrectionists of
January 6th began with a protest, expressing both their freedom of
expression and assembly, but “crossed” the proverbial line when their
expression turned to violent conduct.342
In terms of the January 6th Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, the Act
can play a vital role in prosecuting individuals whose conduct falls under
the language of the Act.343 This singular event provides the government a
strong case to utilize the Act, as it was intended, to support local law
enforcement and punish individuals who used interstate commerce to
perpetuate a violent insurrection.344

C. Moving Forward: Future Outlook on Rundo II
The Ninth Circuit, after severing the Act of its unconstitutional
language, reversed and remanded Rundo II back to the district court. 345
On remand, the district court will likely still vacate the charges brought
against Defendants. In Rundo I, the court invalidated the Act entirely for
being unconstitutional on its face. The district court emphasized that
Defendants’ conduct was protected speech.346 The court, however, was
339. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (providing that, under the Act, “[a] defendant
could be convicted for renting a car with a credit card, posting. . .on Facebook, or
texting friends” as examples of the Act “not just criminalizing the behavior of those in
the heat of a riot.”).
340. See U.S. Att’y’s Off. of D.C., Capitol Breach Cases, www.justice.gov/usaodc/capitol-breach-cases [perma.cc/W6LY-QVW6] (last visited Sept. 22, 2022)
(providing background and information of the individual defendants that were
charged with crimes during the Capitol Riots, many of which defendants do not reside
in the District of Columbia; demonstrating that many had to travel interstate to commit
the crimes they are being charged with).
341. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
342. See Duignan, supra note 335 (reporting that 140 Capitol police were
physically assaulted and $1.5 million worth of damage was caused to the Capitol
building).
343. See id. (describing violent attacks against law enforcement as a group fits
squarely in the scope of the Act).
344. See Jacques Billeaud, Jan. 6 Rioter Who Carried Spear, Wore Horns, Draws 41
Months, AP NEWS (Nov. 17, 2021), apnews.com/article/prisons-arizona-capitol-siege5c9ebf384bf936403d42e1a453c89153 [perma.cc/ARP3-5SYB] (reporting that the
most recognizable January 6th rioter was sentenced to almost four years behind bars,
demonstrates a real-world example of how the federal government could have sought
a five year sentence under the Act).
345. Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
346. See Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d. at 879 (stating that though some of the posts by
the defendants are “repugnant, hateful ideas” and other posts advocate for violence,
they are protected forms of speech).
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careful to maintain that it did not agree with Defendants’ viewpoints. 347
However, the Act does not allow the government to punish abhorrent
speech when that speech does not bring about an imminent threat of
violence required under Brandenburg. 348 Even after the circuit court
severed the unconstitutional language, the district court is unlikely to
change the initial ruling that Defendants’ social media use and travel
within the state of California garners punishment under a federal anti-riot
statute.349
The Central District of California does, however, have another
option. In his Rundo I opinion, Judge Cormac J. Carney makes the point
that these Defendants should be prosecuted under California’s Penal
Codes.350 The option available to the court on remand is sending this case
back to the California state level. This is the correct option. Though the
district court found that Defendants’ hateful expressions were protected
under the First Amendment, their conduct should not go unpunished.351
Moving forward, however, the Act must be used narrowly.352 Today,
the government uses the Act in an attempt to prosecute white
supremacists.353 However, as the old adage states, “wait until the shoe is
on the other foot.” The U.S. could very well be one election away from the
Act being used to chill the very speech that it as a society champions in
2022.354 One need only look no further than the purpose for the Act’s
creation in 1968, which was designed to “temper” the violent protests
occurring in the late 1960s.355 The Act has a place in the federal penal
statutes in prosecuting insurrectionists like those at the January 6th U.S.
Capitol riot. However, these crucial freedoms -the freedom of expression

347. Id.
348. Brandenburg, 397 U.S. at 447.
349. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2101-2102 (1968).
350. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 880 (citing that California state law enforcement
has “its pick” of criminal statutes to prosecute Defendants).
351. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 712-13 (providing a background to Defendants’
conduct at political rallies where RAM members would intentionally confront, pursue,
and assault other protestors).
352. See Zalman, supra note 15, at 911 (providing evidence that the Anti-Riot Act
of 1968 was legislated by conservatives in Congress to further criminalize would be
protestors and rioters that were gathering across the United States to protest racial
injustice and the death of Martin Luther King Jr.).
353. See Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 712-13.
354. See The Shoe is on the Other Foot, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/the%20shoe%20is%20on%20the%20other%20foot
[perma.cc/K78F-CKTM] (defining the saying as it is “used to say that a situation has
changed to the opposite of what it was before”); MIGHTY IRA (Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education 2020) (cautioning against allowing the government to create laws
that restrict speech, even speech of bad actors, because the “political winds” may shift
and a group the government supports today could be the same group a new
government persecutes tomorrow). See Nicole Chavez, 2020: The Year America
Confronted Racism, CNN www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/12/us/america-racism2020/ [perma.cc/4V38-ZFJN] ((last visited Sept. 22, 2022) (providing a timeline of
2020 and the protests advocating for racial equality).
355. See Zalman, supra note 15, at 911 (demonstrating a nefarious origin to the
federal Anti-Riot Act); Recent Case, supra note 42, at 2614.
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and the freedom to peaceably assemble- cannot be left to the often
politically charged federal government. The rights under the First
Amendment must remain protected by the judicial system, as
demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit in Rundo II, where courts remain
stewards of Americans’ freedom of expression by adhering to legal
precedence.356

V.

CONCLUSION

“It is easy to champion free speech when it advocates a viewpoint
with which we agree.”357 The Ninth Circuit correctly applied the
Brandenburg imminence requirement and found that the Act could be
salvaged by severing its unconstitutional language.358 At this moment in
the United States, where the country has seen social unrest echoing that
of the 1960’s, protecting an individual’s freedom of expression under the
First Amendment is vital to our nation’s future.359 In today’s marketplace
of ideas, social media, we must avoid censorship while also rejecting
hatful, degrading speech. Our federal government must temper its use of
the Anti-Riot Act to individuals and circumstances that meet the
Brandenburg imminence requirement.360
The future of the United States of America requires a vast number of
viewpoints to foster innovation, creativity, and tolerance. We, as citizens,
should embrace all forms of expression, and not allow those who are
victims of hate to endure it alone. It is our collective duty to expunge
hateful speech with more uplifting and inspirational speech.361 In the
words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “I believe that unarmed truth and
unconditional love will have the final word in reality.” 362

356. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246,
249 (2018) (stating that “history has shown time and again that governments are
prone to censorial abuse. An enduring challenge for any legal system is balanc[e]”
between promoting the freedom of expression and restricting expression that is
“tremendously harmful.”).
357. Rundo I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 874.
358. See Brandenburg, 397 U.S. at 447-48. See also Rundo II, 990 F.3d at 721.
359. See The Sixties: Moments in Time, supra note 29 (providing an in-depth,
comprehensive timeline of the major events of the 1960’s).
360. Brandenburg, 397 U.S. at 447-48.
361. MIGHTY IRA (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 2020).
362. Martin Luther King Jr., Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1964).
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